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I. BACKGROUND
Seven days after the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress
authorized President Bush "to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those ... persons he determines planned, authorized, committed,
or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001." The
war in Afghanistan, led by the CIA, began shortly thereafter. In response
to the growing number of captured Taliban and al Qaeda forces, the
Department of Defense opened Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,
where detainees would be interrogated and tried by military
commissions.
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1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. IV 2004)).
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On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued an executive order
setting up a system of military commissions to try detainees. 2  The
commissions consisted of a P residing officer along with at least three
other commissioned officers. The defendant was entitled to a copy of
the charges and a presumption of innocence. 4 However, the order also
allowed "the accused and his civilian counsel [to] be excluded from, and
precluded from ever learning what evidence was presented during, any
part of the proceeding that... the presiding officer decides to 'close."
'' 5
Furthermore, all reasonably probative evidence was admissible,
including hearsay, evidence gathered by coercion, and unsworn
testimony. Finally, for all but the most serious cases, the defendant had
no right of appeal outside the executive branch of the government. 7
In November 2001, a Yemeni national named Salim Ahmed
Hamdan was captured, and held by U.S. forces in Afghanistan. 8 In June
2002, Hamdan was transported to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. 9 More than a year later, Hamdan was deemed eligible for
trial by military commission. 10 Hamdan was charged with one count of
conspiracy "to commit . . . offenses triable by military commission."
11
The charge alleged that Hamdan knowingly conspired with al Qaeda
from 1996 until November 2001 to attack civilians and civilian objects,
to murder as an unprivileged belligerent, and to commit acts of terror.
12
Before his hearing, Hamdan filed a petition for writs of habeas
corpus and mandamus challenging the legitimacy of the military
2. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
3. Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 32 C.F.R. § 9.4(a)(2)-(4) (2006).
4. Id. §§ 9.5-.6. The defendant was also either appointed counsel or allowed to
hire a civilian counsel. Id. § 9.4(c).
5. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786 (2006). Grounds for closure
include: protection of classified information, the physical safety of participants or
witnesses, the protection of intelligence or law enforcement sources, methods, or
activities, and "other national security interests." 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(b)(3) (2006). Although
the accused's counsel may be privy to these closed sessions, he or she may be forbidden,
at the presiding officer's discretion, from disclosing to his or her client information
gained from such sessions. Id.
6. See 32 C.F.R. § 9.6(d) (2006); see also Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786-87.
7. Id. at 2787.




12. Id. at 2761. In addition, the charges specifically alleged that Hamdan's duties in
al Qaeda were the general transportation of persons and supplies. Id.
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commission that was to try him. 13 The District Court for the District of
Columbia ruled in favor of Hamdan, and held that, based on the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and its codification of the Geneva
Conventions, the military commissions did not have the power to try
Hamdan. 14 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed,
dismissing Hamdan's challenge based on the grounds that: (1) Congress
has specifically authorized the creation of the tribunals, (2) the Geneva
Conventions were not judicially enforceable, and (3) Hamdan was not
entitled to their protections.15 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on
November 7, 2005.16
II. THE DECISION
Hamdan's appeal presented a series of complex constitutional
issues, and resulted in a splintered plurality decision. The Court had to
decide whether it had the power to hear the case, whether the executive
branch had the power to convene military commissions, and whether the
commissions exceeded Congressionally imposed limitations.
A. The Power of the Court. Jurisdiction over Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
The Government asserted two major challenges to the Court's
exercise of jurisdiction in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. They first asserted that
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) foreclosed the Court's ability
to hear habeas corpus petitions and other proceedings involving persons
detained at Guantanamo Bay. 17 Second, the Government asserted that
precedent dictated the Court should abstain from hearing an appeal from
a military proceeding until there is a final decision by the military
tribunal.18 The plurality decision, written by Justice Stevens, rejected
both arguments.
The DTA contains three jurisdiction-stripping provisions relating to
aliens detained at Guantanamo Bay: suspension of writ of habeas corpus,
limited appeal for decisions in the combatant status review tribunal, and
limited appeal of decisions rendered by the military commissions. 19 A
13. Id. at 2759.
14. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 155, 158-72 (D.D.C. 2004).
15. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
16. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762.
17. Id.; see also Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e),
119 Stat. 2680, 2741-44 (2005) (codified at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e) (West 2006)).
18. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2769. See also id. at 2769-71 (discussing Schlesinger v.
Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975)).
19. Id. at 2763.
2007] 1685
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subsequent clause specifically denies jurisdiction over pending cases on
appeal in the latter two situations, but does not include any reference to
the habeas provision. 20
The Government argued that the suspension of the writ was.... 21
effective immediately upon enactment, precluding jurisdiction. In his
dissent, Justice Scalia agreed, pointing to precedent that found that an
explicit suspension of the writ not only stopped jurisdiction of any future
habeas petitions, but also repealed jurisdiction for all pending cases.22
Hamdan countered that such a reading would raise "grave questions
about Congress' authority to impinge this Court's appellate jurisdiction,"
and would "unconstitutionally suspend[] the writ of habeas corpus."
' 23
The plurality dismissed the line of precedent relied on by Justice
Scalia as a limited exclusion of the general presumption against
retroactivity, stating that jurisdiction-stripping provisions are treated
differently. 24  The plurality interpreted the exclusion of the habeas
provision as a deliberate omission, holding that the DTA did not strip
jurisdiction for pending habeas petitions, like the one involved in
Hamdan.
25
The Government's second grounds for dismissal relied on
Schlesinger v. Councilman,26 which held that courts should abstain from
hearing an appeal from a military proceeding until there is a final
decision. 2 7  Councilman's abstention was based on two separate
justifications. First, failure to abstain would impair the military's ability
to maintain discipline and efficiency. 28 Second, given that the military
courts are not typical Article III courts, the civilian courts should not
interfere with "the balance that Congress struck between military
preparedness and fairness to individual service members."
' 29
20. Id. (citing DTA § 1005(e)(3)).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2810-11 (Scalia, J. dissenting, Thomas, J. & Alito, J., joining) (citing
Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 (1952), as an example of the Court restricting
jurisdiction from pending cases where Congress has limited jurisdiction for a class of
cases). Scalia also addressed and dismissed Hamdan's argument that the DTA
unconstitutionally suspended the writ. Id. at 2818-19 (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S.
372, 381 (1977), for the rule that an adequate and effective alternative to the writ of
habeas corpus, such as appeal to the D.C. Circuit as provided by the DTA, does not
constitute suspension of the writ).
23. Id. at 2764.
24. Id. at 2765.
25. Id. at 2765-66.
26. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
27. Id. at 758.
28. hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2770 (citing Councilman, 420 U.S. at 752).
29. Id. (citing Councilman, 420 U.S. at 758).
1686 [Vol. 33:5
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The Court found that neither justification applied. First, Hamdan
was not a member of the U.S. military, so military discipline and
efficiency was not a concern. Second, the military commissions were
not a part of the "integrated system of military courts," so interference by
the Court did not hamper the balance struck by Congress. 3 1 Because
Councilman did not apply, the Court could reach the merits of Hamdan's
appeal.
B. Executive Power: The President's Enactment of Military
Commissions
1. The Power to Enact Military Commissions
While there was little dissent on the executive's power to convene
commissions in this case, 32 the scope and extent of that power proved
controversial. Justice Thomas strongly advocated that the President's
commander-in-chief powers mandates deference to his decisions on the
military necessity of the commissions as convened.
33
The plurality refused to extend such deference to the President. The
Court cited Ex parte Quirin as support for their reading that Article 21 of
the UCMJ placed an express condition that the President's use of
military commissions must comply with the laws of war.34  It also
pointed to the DTA's language, which expressly reserved judgment on
the constitutionality and legality of the "standards and procedures" of the
commission. 35 Ultimately, it concluded that acts of Congress, such as
the UCMJ and laws of war, limit any Presidential action.36
2. The Power to Try Hamdan for Conspiracy
The Court next examined common law requirements for the
executive's power to convene military commissions. The power of the
30. Id. at 2770-71.
31. Id. at 2771. The Court relied on Ex parte Quirin, in which the Court did not
abstain from hearing a challenge to the legitimacy of military commissions. Id. at 277 1-
72 (citing Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942)).
32. The Court found that Congress had impliedly authorized military commissions
through Article 21 of the UCMJ. Id. at 2774. Congress incorporated Article 15 of the
Articles of War into Article 21 of the UCMJ. Compare 14 U.S.C.A. § 2308a art. 15
(West 1916), with UCMJ art. 21, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).
33. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2823-25 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.).
34. Id. at 2774 (citing Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28).
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executive branch to convene military commissions was largely defined at
common law and later incorporated into Article 21 of the UCMJ. 37 At
common law, an offense must be committed within the "theater of war,"
within the "period of the war," and the offense must allege a violation of
the laws of war.38  The Court concluded that Hamdan's conspiracy
charge did not meet these requirements in that it was not a violation of
the laws of war. 3 9 Although conspiracy charges had been heard by civil
war commissions, which tried both martial law and law of war violations
at the same time, conspiracy was "not a stand-alone offense against the
law of war."
' 40
C. Legislative Power: The Limits Placed on Military Commissions
The Court next examined what substantive limitations Congress
placed on the military commissions. The UCMJ "conditions the
President's use of military commissions on compliance not only with the
American common law of war, but also with the rest of the UCMJ itself.
. . and with the 'rules and precepts of the law of nations."' 4 1  Such
compliance with the UCMJ and laws of war, however, would prove
problematic for President Bush's military commissions.
1. Uniformity Requirements of the UCMJ
Article 36 of the UCMJ places two restrictions on the President's
power to promulgate rules of procedure for military commissions.
42
First, any procedural rule adopted must comply with the UCMJ. 43
Second, the procedural rules governing the military commissions must be
uniform with those governing courts-martial proceedings, unless the
government could show that such uniformity was impracticable. 44 The
37. Id. at 2777.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2778.
40. Id. at 2783. The Court supported this by referencing the Nuremberg Tribunal,
which refused to allow conspiracy as a triable charge, and the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, neither of which mention conspiracy as a violation of the laws of war. Id.
at 2784-85. Justice Thomas countered that any indictment need not be stated with
precision, and that the Government had charged Hamdan with two distinct violations of
the laws of war-namely, "membership in a war-criminal enterprise and conspiracy to
commit war crimes." Id. at 2830 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 2786 (citing Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
42. UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (2000).
43. Id. § 836(a).
44. Id. § 836(b) (requiring procedural rules adopted for military commissions to be
"uniform insofar as practicable" with those governing courts-martial proceedings).
1688 [Vol. 33:5
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 5 [2007], Art. 11
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss5/11
HAMDAN V. RUMSFELD
Court found that the procedural rules adopted for the military
commissions, such as the denial of a defendant's right to be present
during trial, were not uniform with those governing courts-martial
proceedings.45 It also rejected arguments that the danger posed by• • 46
international terrorism made deviation impracticable. Thus, it held the.... 47
UCMJ prohibited the use of such military commissions.
2. Regularly Constituted Court Under the Geneva Conventions
The Court also invalidated the military commissions on the grounds
that the procedures violated the laws of war, in particular, the Geneva
Conventions. 4 8  The Court of Appeals had held that the Geneva
Conventions were not judicially enforceable, and that Hamdan was not
entitled to their protections.4 9  The Court, however, found that the
Geneva Conventions were judicially enforceable in this case, based on
its interpretation of Article 21 of the UCMJ, which required that military
commissions be authorized by statute or by the laws of war. 51 Because
no congressionally-enacted statute specifically authorized the use of the
commissions, compliance with all laws of war-including the Geneva
Conventions-was a necessary precondition to the executive establishing
the military commissions.
52
The Court of Appeals had found that Hamdan was not protected
under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions because the U.S.'s
conflict with al Qaeda crossed national borders, and therefore, did not fit
within Common Article 3's scope of "armed conflicts not of an
international character." 53  The Court disagreed with this reasoning,
stating "[t]he term 'conflict not of an international character' is used here
in contradistinction to a conflict between nations." 54  The Court
construed the phrase "not of an international character" according to its
45. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2791-92. Thomas argued that any uniformity
requirement in Article 36 was intended to apply across the branches of the military rather
than to military commissions. Id. at 2842-43 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The Court did not
reach the conclusion of whether any procedures of the military commissions were
inconsistent with the UCMJ, an Article 36 requirement. Id. at 2791-92.
46. Id. at 2792. Thomas believed the executive branch should be given deference
on the determination of impracticability. Id. at 2839-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 2793.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2794-98.
51. Id. at 2794.
52. Id.
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literal meaning-a conflict not between two nations. 55  Hamdan was
therefore entitled to the protections of Common Article 3 because the
war with al Qaeda was not a war between nations.
56
Common Article 3 prohibits the "passing of sentences and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial suarantees which
are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." The Court held
the military commission violated this provision in two ways. First, the
plurality concluded that military commissions were not "regularly
constituted court[s]." 59  Instead, "the regular military courts in our
system are the courts-martial established by congressional statutes."
60
Second, the military commissions did not afford "all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples."' 6 1  Although this phrase was not defined by the Geneva
Conventions, the plurality found it must include at least the "barest of
those trial protections that have been recognized by customary
international law," including the right of an accused to be tried in his
presence and to be privy to the evidence against him. 62  Thus, in not
affording the accused these barest trial protections, the military
commissions violated Common Article 3.63
III. CONCLUSION
In prohibiting the type of military commission used to try Hamdan,
the Court did not question the Government's ability to hold detainees for
the duration of the conflict. 64  Rather, the Court merely held that the
55. Id. at 2796.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 2795 (emphasis added). The dissenting opinions argued that because no
sentence or execution had been carried out, this term had not been activated. Id. at 2846-
47 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2797-98.
59. Id. at 2797. Justice Alito's dissent argued that even if a military commission is
different from a court-martial, it still forms a regularly constituted court if consistent with
the "domestic law" of the convening country. Id. at 2851 (Alito, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2797. Without a "practical need" to deviate from a courts-martial
proceeding, the military commissions can not be regularly constituted within the meaning
of Common Article 3. Id.
61. See id. at 2797-98. Justice Kennedy declined to join this section of the opinion.
62. Id. at 2797. These rights are protected by Protocol I, Article 75(4)(e). Although
the U.S. has not ratified Protocol I, its objection was not as to Article 75. Id. (citing
William H. Taft, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE
J. INT'L L. 319, 322 (2003)).
63. See id. at 2797-98.
64. Id. at 2798.
1690 [Vol. 33:5
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military commissions' deviation from courts-martial procedures was not
justified-and, without Congressional approval, the President lacks
authority to establish military commissions that do not comply with all
laws of wars. 65 As Justice Breyer stressed in his concurrence, the Court
was simply forcing the President to ask Congress for additional
authority. 6  Taking these words to heart, on September 6, 2006, the
President addressed the nation, asking Congress to pass legislation
approving a new military commissions system and to "clarify" the
requirements of Common Article 3. 67
65. See id.
66. See id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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